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Equality beyond dignity: Multi-dimensional
equality and Justice Langa’s judgments
CATHERINE ALBERTYN* AND SANDRA FREDMAN†
The tendency for SouthAfrican equality jurisprudence to reduce equality to a
single value, namely dignity, has been much debated, especially around the
relationship of dignity to disadvantage. In this article we argue for a multi-
dimensional idea of equality that moves beyond a dignity/disadvantage
paradigm to enable a fuller exploration of the complex harms and injuries that
underlie equality claims, and greater elucidation of the multiple principles and
purposes of equality. In particular, we argue that substantive equality should be
understood in terms of a four-dimensional framework, which aims at address-
ing stigma, stereotyping, prejudice and violence; redressing socio-economic
disadvantage; facilitating participation; and valuing and accommodating differ-
ence through structural change. We suggest that this enables a better explora-
tion of the different principles that underlie equality and an open discussion of
complementarities and tensions between them.We explore the benefits of this
approach through an evaluation of three equality cases in which Justice Langa
delivered the leading judgments. Although we do not claim that he fully
adopted such an approach, we engage Justice Langa’s philosophy on equality
as it emerges from these judgments, and evaluate the extent to which we can
develop from this a more fully-fledged understanding of equality and its
underlying values in the SouthAfrican Constitution.
I INTRODUCTION
In Brink v Kitshoff, the first equality case of the South African Constitu-
tional Court, O’Regan J, writing for the court, identified the purpose of
the constitutional right to equality as remedying patterns of disadvantage.1
However, in a trio of cases that followed this, the court effectively placed
dignity at the centre of the equality right, noting that its purpose was to
accord equal dignity and equal human worth to all human beings,
regardless of their membership of particular groups. This required that
everyone be treated with equal concern and respect. This elevation of a
largely undefined, and abstract notion of dignity as human worth, and the
apparent displacement of other purposes, especially that of remedying
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systemic disadvantage, generated significant debate about the definition
and application of the right.2
This continued commitment to dignity as the core of the equality right
raises several questions: Can dignity act as a placeholder for all the
inequalities and harms that the idea of substantive equality seeks to
address? Is there no place for other values and principles in evaluating
whether the equality right has been violated? Subsuming too much under
the heading of dignity risks obscuring the different values and mediating
principles that underlie equality and are visible, although not always
explicit, in the court’s jurisprudence. The core notion of dignity can be
seen to address the harms of stigma, humiliation, stereotyping and
prejudice. However, the idea of substantive equality clearly encompasses
other values that are not reducible to dignity, including redressing social
and economic disadvantage, promoting voice and participation, and
affirming difference through structural and institutional change.3 Even
more problematically, the sole reliance on dignity gives little guidance on
how to address tensions or conflicts between dignity and the other core
values of substantive equality, and the different dimensions of (in)equality
that they might represent.
In this article, we aim to move beyond the attempt to reduce equality
to a single value. The elevation of dignity in SouthAfrica has often meant
that disadvantage is not fully explored, if at all, and that issues of
difference, diversity and inclusion are often viewed only through the
prism of dignity’s relation to individual identity formation and self-
realisation (rather than their relationship to more systemic disadvantage
and structural inequality).4 Instead, we argue for a multi-dimensional
understanding of equality that enables a fuller grasp of the different facets
of inequality which the right to substantive equality aims to redress.
Dignity on its own could be criticised for being too individualistic,
and for privileging stigma harms over socio-economic disadvantage.
However, these potential defects can be mitigated if dignity (understood
as redressing stigma, stereotyping, and prejudice) is buttressed by other
values, such as redressing socio-economic disadvantage, facilitating
participation, and accommodating difference through structural change.
2 C Albertyn & B Goldblatt ‘Facing the challenge of transformation: Difficulties in the
development of an indigenous jurisprudence of equality’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 248; DM Davis
‘Equality: The majesty of legoland jurisprudence’ (1999) 116 SALJ 398; S Cowen ‘Can dignity
guide our equality jurisprudence?’ (2001) 17 SAJHR 34.
3 For different iterations of the need to recognise different principles, dimensions and values
underlying the equality right see:Albertyn & Goldblatt (n 2); S Fredman Discrimination Law 2 ed
(2011) 8–33; S Fredman ‘Redistribution and recognition: Reconciling inequalities’ (2007) 23
SAJHR 214; H Botha ‘Equality, plurality and structural power’ (2009) 25 SAJHR 1; CAlbertyn
‘Constitutional equality in South Africa’ in O Dupper & C Garbers (eds) Equality in the
Workplace: Reflections from South Africa and Beyond (2009) 75.
4 Albertyn & Goldblatt (n 2).
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Likewise, potentially problematic implications of sole reliance on redress-
ing socio-economic disadvantage are less likely if this value is comple-
mented by the other values which substantive equality embraces. For
example, social security schemes which redress disadvantage can generate
stigma and exclusion. They should therefore be designed to avoid stigma
and enhance participation and social inclusion if they are genuinely to
address substantive equality.
Although various scholars have sought to develop singular conceptual
frameworks for equality based on dignity5 or (to a lesser extent) disadvan-
tage alone,6 we suggest that this risks over-burdening these values with
multiple, contested meanings as well as seeking consistency in the
jurisprudence, where there is, in fact, contestation. Moreover, with a
Constitution based on multiple democratic values and an understanding
of equality that is multi-faceted and complex, it makes conceptual and
analytic sense to acknowledge and work with these different dimensions
and values. No one value should take up all the space – dignity, equality,
freedom and others should be interpreted in a generous, progressive and
complementary manner, giving each its place within the overall, transfor-
mative project of the Constitution.
In this article we therefore argue for a multi-dimensional idea of
equality which enables a fuller exploration of the complexity of the harms
and injuries that underlie equality claims, and greater elucidation of the
multiple principles and purposes of equality. In particular, we argue that
substantive equality should be understood in terms of a four dimensional
framework, which aims at addressing stigma, stereotyping, prejudice and
violence; redressing socio-economic disadvantage; facilitating participa-
tion; and valuing and accommodating difference through structural
change. We suggest that this approach enables a better exploration of the
different principles that underlie equality and, crucially, an open discus-
sion of complementarities and tensions between them.
We explore the benefits of this multi-dimensional approach through an
evaluation of three equality cases in which the late Chief Justice Langa
delivered the leading judgment: City Council of Pretoria v Walker,7 Bhe v
Magistrate Khayelitsha8 and Pillay v MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal.9
We suggest that these judgments and his extra-curial writings indicate that
5 See eg S Woolman ‘Dignity’ in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South
Africa 2 ed (2005) chap 36 (in a South African context) and D Reaume ‘Discrimination and
dignity’ (2003) 63 Louisiana LR 645 (in a Canadian context).
6 See eg C McConnachie ‘Human dignity, ‘‘unfair discrimination’’ and guidance’ (2014) 34
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 609–29, reviewing L Ackermann Human Dignity: Lodestar for
Equality in South Africa (2012).
7 1998 (2) SA363 (CC).
8 2005 (1) SA580 (CC).
9 2008 (1) SA474 (CC).
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Justice Langa was sympathetic to a more multi-dimensional approach.
Although we do not claim that he fully adopted such an approach,
we suggest that his work illustrates the possibilities and challenges of
balancing different facets of equality to achieve just, substantive equality
results. Thus, we engage Justice Langa’s philosophy on equality as it
emerges from these judgments, and evaluate the extent to which we can
develop from this a more fully-fledged understanding of equality and its
underlying values in the SouthAfrican Constitution.
In the next section, we draw out the elements of substantive equality
and briefly note their presence in equality jurisprudence. Thereafter, we
explore their place in Langa’s judgments and, through a critical engage-
ment with these judgments, we suggest that courts reach better results
when they take account of all dimensions of equality. Given that two of
Justice Langa’s three equality judgments deal with the often tricky
relationship between gender equality and cultural diversity, we also
comment on the extent to which a multi-dimensional approach to the
jurisprudence enables an effective interrogation and resolution of both of
these important constitutional commitments. Finally, we sum up the
possibilities of Justice Langa’s equality judgments and suggest that build-
ing on his legacy requires the conceptual development and clearer
articulation of these various elements or dimensions, and the complex
ways in which they interact, so that they can work together to create a
powerful substantive vision of equality.
II SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY
The development of the idea of substantive, rather than formal, equality
was well-established in academic literature and some comparative equal-
ity law when the South African Constitution was written in the early
1990s, and it is widely acknowledged that the Constitution promotes
substantive equality.10 As a value, the constitutional commitment to
substantive equality requires attention to actual social and economic
inequalities in society, to remedial and redistributive action and to
achieving a society in which every person participates fully and is able to
develop to his or her full human potential.11 As discussed further below,
we suggest that substantive equality is best understood as a complex and
multi-dimensional concept.
Equality – especially substantive equality – is a contested principle.
South Africa is no exception. Generally, a legal commitment to substan-
tive equality emerges from a recognition of the failure of formal equality
10 For early discussions of this in a South African context, see C Albertyn & J Kentridge
‘Introducing the right to equality in the interim Constitution’ (1994) 10 SAJHR 149; Albertyn
& Goldblatt (n 2).
11 As promised by the preamble to the Constitution.
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to change deep-seated social inequalities based on race, gender, or other
status. Simply barring classifications based on race, sex or other status has
not been sufficient: instead, it is the disadvantage attached to such
classifications that matters. This has led to an important emphasis on
remedying socio-economic disadvantage as a core principle of substantive
equality. This means that substantive equality is specifically asymmetric: it
focuses on the disadvantaged group rather than requiring equal treatment
for its own sake. Where equal treatment exacerbates disadvantage, sub-
stantive equality might be breached; and conversely, where differential
treatment is necessary to redress disadvantage, substantive equality might
be furthered. South Africa’s commitment to substantive equality has
meant that its constitutional equality jurisprudence has always emphasised
the effects of differentiation, and recognised that equality is not always
served by similar treatment. ‘Indirect’ discrimination, differential treat-
ment and positive measures are central to understanding South Africa’s
concept of equality, as is a methodological approach that rejects abstrac-
tion and requires proper consideration of context and impact.12
More controversial, however, has been the choice of principles and
values that define the content and purpose of the right, and provide the
standards by which to test whether and when differentiation amounts to
impermissible discrimination and inequality. Here, both disadvantage and
dignity have vied for prominence in the literature and (to a lesser extent)
in the constitutional jurisprudence of South Africa (and Canada). Much
more muted is the idea of participation as an element of equality. Perhaps
first raised by Justice Sachs in National Coalition of Gay and Lesbian Equality
v Minister of Justice13 as an idea that outsider groups (in this case gays and
lesbians) should participate fully in decision-making so that their ideas,
experiences and moral approaches are fully taken account of,14 it has also
appeared within an understanding of dignity as political vulnerability.15
Concerns about identity, difference and diversity have also emerged in the
jurisprudence, but again are often subsumed by the idea of dignity,16 and
often through the lens of individual identity, rather than their relationship
to more systemic disadvantage and structural inequality.17 Thus several
12 For a discussion of the legal mechanisms of substantive equality under the South African
Constitution, see C Albertyn & B Goldblatt ‘Equality’ in Woolman & Bishop (n 5) chap 35,
5–7.
13 1999 (1) SA6 (CC).
14 National Coalition (n 13) para 132, citing R Dworkin ‘Equality, democracy and constitu-
tion’ (1990) 28 Alberta LR 324.
15 See eg Larbi-Odam & Others v MEC for Education & Another 1998 (1) SA 745 (CC) paras
19–20; Walker (n 7) para 48.
16 See n 2.
17 See eg National Coalition (n 13) para 26; Fourie and Another; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project
and Others v Minister of Home Affairs 2006 (1) SA524 (CC) para 15; Pillay (n 9) para 53.
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dimensions of equality are visible, if not fully articulated, within the
jurisprudence.We turn to examine these dimensions in more detail.
(1) Dignity and disadvantage
Led by the equality jurisprudence on sexual orientation, dignity is
generally recognised as the core value and standard of s 9(3). Although a
contested concept even in South African jurisprudence, the dominant
meaning accorded dignity is one of (equal) concern and respect, and the
need to affirm an individual’s sense of self-worth. The major harms
underlying this are recognition-based and relate to stereotyping, stigma
and prejudice resulting in exclusion, denigration and harm, and imping-
ing on individual self-worth.
In the context of the sheer degradation and dehumanisation which was
a central element of the institutionalised race discrimination under
apartheid, the importance of dignity is incontrovertible. It captures the
basic instinct that the right to equality should counter stigma, humiliation,
prejudice and violence. Incorporating dignity into the right to equality
also dilutes the purely relative nature of the equal treatment doctrine.
Dignity creates a substantive underpinning of the right to equal treatment:
it is inconceivable that treating two people equally badly could fulfil a
right to equality as dignity. It means that the right to equality could never
be achieved by ‘levelling down’.18
However, dignity also carries problematic baggage. One aspect of this
is the extent to which dignity can cut across and dilute the emphasis on
disadvantage. In a controversial series of cases, the Canadian Supreme
Court held that the fact of inflicting or perpetuating disadvantage on a
protected group was not sufficient to breach the equality principle in s 15
of the Canadian Charter because dignity had not been impaired.19 A
second problematic aspect of dignity is its potential to focus on the
individual, rather than on patterns of institutional or structural inequal-
ity.20 Dignity, both as a subjective feeling of individual harm and as a more
objective idea of injury to individual self-worth, tends to advance an idea
of discrimination as social prejudice against individuals, rather than as
systemic, group-based discrimination embedded in the structures, pro-
cesses and institutions of society.
In some majority and minority judgments, the SouthAfrican Constitu-
tional Court appeared to recognise, if implicitly, that material disadvan-
tage, while often characterised as affecting self-worth (or dignity), was
18 Fredman Discrimination Law (n 3) 21.
19 Gosselin v Quebec [2002] 4 SCR 429, now overtaken by R v Kapp [2008] 2 SCR 483which
held that dignity was a background value, but not a specific legal factor that needed to be proved
by the complainant.
20 SeeAlbertyn & Goldblatt (n 2).
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perhaps an autonomous dimension of inequality. We suggest below that
Justice Langa’s majority judgment in City Council of Pretoria v Walker is an
example of the explicit use of material disadvantage as a separate dimen-
sion of equality. More commonly, however, social and economic dis-
advantage, and the exacerbation of material disadvantage, even
destitution, were characterised as important aspects of the absence of
dignity and the failure to respect common humanity. Thus in separate
minority judgments in Volks NO v Robinson, Mokgoro and O’Regan JJ,
and Sachs J found an impairment of dignity in the law’s failure to
recognise financial need and dependence in not protecting surviving
partners of a cohabiting relationships.21 In Union of Refugee Women v
Director: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority Mokgoro, O’Regan
and Van der Westhuizen JJ and Langa CJ concluded that the impairment
of dignity related not only to the ‘social stigma which may result from
such discrimination, but also the material [or financial] impact it may have
on refugees’.22 And in Khosa v Minister of Social Development,23 the
majority found that the material (economic) impact of exclusion, and
situations where members of outsider groups were forced into ‘relation-
ships of dependency upon families, friends and community’, ‘relegated to
the margins of society’ and ‘cast in the role of supplicants’ violated dignity,
and thus equality.24 In socio-economic rights jurisprudence, the idea that
‘decisions about the allocation of public benefits represent the extent to
which poor people are treated as equal members of society’,25 saw the idea
of equal concern and respect require government to attend to people’s
legitimate needs in acting to provide a minimum core of benefits
(although not as a substantive guarantee of this).
Nevertheless, despite a tendency to soak up multiple harms within the
broad notion of dignity as intrinsic human worth, there are indicators in
the jurisprudence that certain forms of inequality are not reducible to
dignity. In particular, dignity does not fully capture the idea of remedying
systemic patterns of social and economic disadvantage, entrenched in the
structures, institutions and processes of society. It is our argument that
dignity, as stigma and prejudice, and disadvantage, as socio-economic
inequality and material deprivation, should be treated as separate equality
harms. This allows us to recognise the complexity of equality claims, and
to understand when they might pull in opposite directions (thus requiring
21 Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC), per O’Regan and Mokgoro JJ
(dissenting); and Sachs J (dissenting).
22 Union of Refugee Women and Others v Director, Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority
and Others 2007 (4) SA395 (CC) paras 122 and 123.
23 Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA
505 (CC).
24 Khosa (n 23) paras 74 and 76–7.
25 Khosa (n 23) para 74.
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resolution as in Walker),26 where they intersect to exacerbate inequality
(such as in Bhe),27 or where one form of equality harm can generate
additional, and greater inequality. For example,Mokgoro andO’Regan JJ’s
minority judgment in Union of Refugee Women recognises that prejudice
against ‘foreigners’ (impairment of dignity) can result in material disad-
vantage. On the other hand, the presence of material disadvantage and
poverty might itself generate stigma and prejudice, and thus also impair
dignity.28
(2) Additional dimensions of equality: Difference and diversity, inclusion and
participation
Although addressing stigma and material disadvantage are two important
dimensions of substantive equality, they do not exhaust the full reach of
the equality concept. Also central to equality is the need to affirm
difference and diversity, not just on an individual, but also on a structural
basis, and to counter exclusion and marginalisation, whether political or
social, through fostering inclusion, voice and participation.
(a) Difference and diversity
Difference is a central feature of substantive equality. As noted above, it is
not the fact of difference, but the detriment that flows from it, that is of
issue. Indeed, differing identities are a valuable part of an individual’s life,
and conformity should not be the price for equality. To address this,
substantive equality needs to affirm differing individual and group-based
identities, as will be seen in our discussion of Pillay below. This not only
requires attention to individual identity formation and self-realisation, as
expressed in South Africa’s sexual orientation jurisprudence,29 but also to
the manner in which difference is tied to group-based disadvantage. Here
structural change may be necessary to ensure that different identities can
thrive equally in society. For women, for example, this would require a
radical change in the division of labour within the home, and the
male-dominated structure of paid working time. For people with disabili-
ties, this might require changes in the built environment, introduction of
technologies, changes in working hours or other measures.
Thus the third dimension of equality should affirm difference and
contribute to effecting structural change. In general, South African
jurisprudence has always recognised that difference may serve equality,
and that identity formation, central to dignity, is an important aspect of
non-discrimination and equality. However, perhaps because of the
26 As discussed below.
27 As discussed below.
28 Khosa (n 23) para 74.
29 See the cases cited above (n 17).
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emphasis on dignity and individual identity formation as formative of
difference and diversity, the links between difference, diversity and
group-based disadvantage – and the need for structural change – have not
always been clearly identified and interrogated. In particular, should
individual identities be accommodated by way of an exception to the
dominant norm, thus potentially simply reinforcing that norm, or is more
fundamental structural change required? For example, in the context of
gender, accommodation of child-caring roles has generally taken the form
of part-time work. Yet, because the underlying division of labour in the
home is not addressed, part-time work is invariably predominantly
female, precarious and low-paid. In such circumstances, instead of rein-
forcing the norm by accommodating difference, substantive equality
requires structural change in working hours, so that both men and
women can be participative parents. However, in other circumstances, it
might be appropriate to create exceptions to a rule, in particular to
accommodate religious difference, rather than removing the rule alto-
gether. Thus, as we will see in Pillay below, the court concluded that the
cultural requirement on a school girl to wear a nose stud might be better
addressed by creating an exception to the rule rather than abolishing it
altogether.
(b) Inclusion and participation
A further key problem that substantive equality aims to address is social,
economic and political exclusion. This can be conceived of in different
ways. John Hart Ely, in his justification of judicial review under the US
Constitution, argued that where the political channels are blocked, so that
some groups are permanently ‘in’ and others are permanently ‘out’, there
is a need for intervention. US jurisprudence developed this principle
primarily in the context of race discrimination, regarding any classifica-
tions disadvantaging a ‘discrete and insular minority’ as suspect and subject
to strict scrutiny under the US equality guarantee, the Fourteenth
Amendment. Of course, this speaks to any group that might be seen to be
politically vulnerable and excluded from the political process: a point
made by the South African Constitutional Court about gay men,30
permanent residents as non-citizens31 and whites.32 However, this is often
addressed within the context of evaluating an individual impairment of
dignity (as stigma or affecting self-worth) under the equality right, rather
than as a factor which contributes in its own right to lack of fulfilment of
the right.
30 National Coalition (n 13) para 25.
31 Larbi-Odam (n 15); Khosa (n 23).
32 Walker (n 7) as discussed below.
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Exclusion can be viewed more broadly as the social and economic
exclusion of persons based on their group membership. This aspect of
substantive equality recognises that individuals are essentially social, and
marginalisation from social life is particularly dehumanising. Although
closely tied to economic disadvantage, it speaks separately to social
alienation, ‘otherness’, and segregation. In a similar fashion, equality is
characterised by Fraser as parity of participation,33 by Collins as social
inclusion34 and by Barnard as solidarity.35 We suggest that the need to
address obstacles to social, economic and political participation associated
with being a member of an out-group should be an essential purpose of
equality, and adds a further dimension to substantive equality. Fostering
inclusion and, particularly, participation are thus crucial to overcoming
discrimination and inequality. This aspect of inequality – as exclusion and
lack of participation arising from group-based disadvantage – has not been
fully drawn out in SouthAfrican jurisprudence, as discussed below.
(3) Overlapping, multi-dimensional and contested equality
Given the overlapping and multi-dimensional nature of these principles
of equality, it seems difficult to isolate one of them as the essence of
substantive equality. It is more helpful to regard substantive equality as
multi-dimensional. In particular, we have suggested that four dimensions
can be identified: (i) redressing social and economic disadvantage,
(ii) addressing stigma, prejudice, humiliation and violence (dignity),
(iii) accommodating and affirming difference, diversity and identity,
through structural change, and (iv) enhancing voice and participation. By
distinguishing between these dimensions, we are able to understand the
complex and multi-faceted nature of inequality, the manner in which
different dimensions might conflict or complement one another, or might
intersect with or reinforce each other. Where one of the dimensions
conflicts with one of the others, it is possible to resolve the tension by
referring to the schema as whole. Thus, while dignity should be fur-
thered, it could not, consistently with the multi-dimensional approach,
be furthered at the expense of redressing disadvantage. Moreover, if one
of the dimensions is neglected in the analysis, a breach of substantive
equality might be missed. Nor do the dimensions need to be strictly
insulated from each other. Disadvantage could encompass dignity harms,
as well as socio-economic harms. Affirming difference and identity also
speaks to remedying structural disadvantage. However, it is analytically
33 N Fraser &AHonneth Redistribution or Recognition (2003).
34 H Collins ‘Discrimination, equality and social inclusion’ (2003) 66 MLR 16.
35 C Barnard ‘The future of labour law: Equality and beyond’ in C Barnard et al (eds) The
Future of Labour Law: Libor Amicorum Sir Bob Hepple (2004) 213.
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useful to keep them separate when evaluating whether a measure or
action breaches substantive equality.
We suggest that these dimensions are already present in South African
equality jurisprudence, but that they need to be drawn out and elucidated.
We seek to do that through an evaluation of Justice Langa’s equality
judgments. In doing so, however, we are mindful of the philosophical
differences that tend to underpin a reliance of dignity over disadvantage,
or vice versa, or different approaches to diversity and difference, and to
inclusion and participation. As hinted at above, these concepts or dimen-
sions are deeply contested and have different theoretical roots. For
example, the principle of remedying systemic disadvantage finds its roots
in feminist and critical race thinking, whilst dignity has been prominent in
liberal egalitarian thought. We do not have the space, in this article, to
develop our understanding of the tensions and overlaps between liberal
egalitarian and critical theory in approaching equality. However, both
find purchase in South African experiences of inequality and in the
jurisprudence. This contestation in the jurisprudence, and the prospect
that dignity can be used for both progressive and conservative ends, is
often obfuscated in discussions of equality and dignity. By using a
multi-faceted approach, we argue that these tensions can be better
expressed and mediated. Dignity should not be seen as a rival to the value
of redressing economic disadvantage or achieving systemic change:
instead, our understanding of dignity must be contextualised and but-
tressed by a simultaneous recognition of the need to address disadvantage,
difference and exclusion through the right to substantive equality. This
means that dignity cannot be understood in ways that conflict with these
complementary values. Similarly, the value of diversity and accommodat-
ing difference needs to be seen in the context of and supported by the
need to redress disadvantage, address stigma and facilitate participation.
This is particularly pertinent in the context of customary law in South
Africa, as we suggest in relation to the Bhe case below. While customary
law should not be subordinated to the dominant norm, this value cannot
trump the other values, by subjecting women to disadvantage, demeaning
treatment and voicelessness.
III JUSTICE LANGA’S EQUALITY JUDGMENTS
(1) Disadvantage, dignity and voice: City Council of Pretoria v Walker
Walker, the earliest major equality case in which Langa DP, as he then was,
gave the leading judgment, raises some acutely difficult questions, par-
ticularly regarding the relationships between material disadvantage, dig-
nity as countering stigma and affirming self-worth, and voice – three
dimensions of substantive equality that potentially pulled in different
directions.
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The City Council of Pretoria had deliberately decided to treat the
residents of black townships, Mamelodi and Atteridgeville, differently
from those of old Pretoria, by applying a flat-rate tariff to the former and a
consumption-based tariff to the latter. A more lenient view on the
collection of tariffs had also been applied to the residents of Mamelodi and
Atteridgeville than to the residents of old Pretoria. Because old Pretoria
was still predominantly white and the former townships overwhelmingly
black, the impact of both these measures – more expensive services and
greater enforcement of municipal debts – fell predominantly on the white
group. The respondents, a group of white residents in old Pretoria,
complained of unfair discrimination in both instances, but in neither case
did they claim that they had been subject to material disadvantage.
Writing for nine out of ten judges, Langa DP recognised that the measure
treated the residents of old Pretoria in a different manner to those of
Mamelodi and Atteridgeville, and that this amounted to indirect race
discrimination. He concluded that the discrimination was fair in relation
to the different rates charged, but unfair in the selective enforcement of
debts.
Walker was written after the court had established the Harksen v Lane36
test for unfair discrimination: a two-stage enquiry which first tested for
discrimination by enquiring whether there was differentiation on a
prohibited ground, and then evaluated fairness with an overall regard to
whether there had been an impairment of dignity. Disadvantage was
present in the test, but only as one of the factors to be taken into account
in determining whether dignity was impaired.Although the test’s empha-
sis on context and impact (the effects and circumstances of differentiation
rather than differentiation per se) meant that the right to equality in s 8 of
the interimConstitution (now s 9 of the 1996 Constitution) was ‘substan-
tive’ in a legal sense, there remained some debate about whether there
could be a breach of the right to equality when no material or other
disadvantage had been established, but where there was an alleged
violation of dignity (as some kind of impairment of self-worth).
Langa DP had no difficulty in finding that the differential tariffs did not
constitute unfair discrimination. Here his approach was a holistic one,
recognising and addressing the separate harms of material disadvantage
and dignity/stigma. Indeed, when discussing the effects of apartheid, he
stated:
Differentiation on the basis of race . . . was a source of grave assaults on the
dignity of black people in particular. It was however not human dignity alone that
suffered. White areas in general were affluent and black ones were in the main
36 1998 (1) SA300 (CC).
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impoverished. Many privileges were dispensed by the government on the
basis of race, with white people being the primary beneficiaries.37
In the case before him, he found no material disadvantage, exclusion, or
stigma against the white residents and therefore no breach of their right to
equality. He concluded that these measures ‘did not impact adversely on
the respondent in any material way. There was no invasion of the
respondent’s dignity nor was he affected in a manner comparably serious to an
invasion of his dignity.’38 Although dignity was powerful in the Harksen test
that Justice Langa sought to apply, he seemed to resist shoehorning
poverty and material disadvantage into dignity by retaining a distinction
in describing the nature of the harm and its impact on the complainants.
Although implicit, this case clearly suggests that dignity might not be the
sole defining value in equality cases.
The selective enforcement of debts was more difficult. Although this
part of the judgment introduces more dimensions into the analysis, the
balance between the various dimensions is uneven. In determining
whether discrimination could be triggered by an impairment of dignity
(as self-worth), Justice Langa summed up the dilemma as follows:
The respondent does however belong to a racial minority which could, in a
political sense, be regarded as vulnerable. It is precisely individuals who are
members of such minorities who are vulnerable to discriminatory treatment
and who, in a very special sense, must look to the Bill of Rights for protection.
When that happens a Court has a clear duty to come to the assistance of the
person affected. Courts should however always be astute to distinguish
between genuine attempts to promote and protect equality on the one hand
and actions calculated to protect pockets of privilege at a price which amounts
to the perpetuation of inequality and disadvantage to others on the other.39
All the major dimensions of substantive equality can be discerned in this
judgment. It stresses two dimensions which, in this case, attracted
particular attention from the court. The first refers to the participative
dimension. For the very reason that the respondents belonged to a racial
minority which could be regarded as vulnerable politically, they should be
able to look to the Bill of Rights for protection. This strongly echoes John
Hart Ely’s vision of the function of judicial review under the US Equal
Protection Clause. The second is the dimension concerned with stigma,
prejudice and humiliation. For him, no ‘members of a racial group should
be made to feel that they are not deserving of equal concern, respect and
consideration’.40 The dimension concerning the need to redress material
37 Walker (n 7) para 46 (emphasis added).
38 Walker (n 7) para 68 (emphasis added).
39 Walker (n 7) para 48.
40 Walker (n 7) para 81.
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disadvantage, however, pointed in the opposite direction (there was no
disadvantage). The same is true for the dimension requiring a restructur-
ing of institutions to accommodate difference: in this case, the policy of
encouragement and changing the culture of non-payment, and the
history of non-payment in the townships as a political issue.
Nevertheless, it was the second dimension, relating to the creation of
stigma and prejudice, that eclipsed the others in the judgment on selective
enforcement of debt:
No members of a racial group should be made to feel that they are not
deserving of equal concern, respect and consideration and that the law is likely
to be used against them more harshly than others who belong to other race
groups. That is the grievance that the respondent has and it is a grievance that
the council officials foresaw when they adopted their policy. The conduct of
the council officials seen as a whole over the period from June 1995 to the
time of the trial in May 1996 was on the face of it discriminatory. The impact
of such a policy on the respondent and other persons similarly placed, viewed
objectively in the light of the evidence on record, would in my view have
affected them in a manner which is at least comparably serious to an invasion
of their dignity. This was exacerbated by the fact that they had been misled and
misinformed by the council. In the circumstances it must be held that the
presumption has not been rebutted and that the course of conduct of which
the respondent complains in this respect, amounted to unfair discrimination
within the meaning of section 8(2) of the interim Constitution.41
This dignity approach trumps the idea of disadvantage, leaving no room
for evaluating dignity against the fact that the complainants suffered no
material harm.
This can be contrasted with the strongly-worded dissent of Sachs J. For
him, to establish prima facie indirect discrimination,42 the measure must ‘at
least impose identifiable disabilities . . . or threaten to touch on or
reinforce patterns of disadvantage, or in some proximate and concrete
manner threaten the dignity or equal concern or worth of the persons
affected.’43 Sachs J acknowledged that ‘the doors of the courts must of
course always be equally open to all South Africans, independently of
whether historically they have been privileged or oppressed. Indeed
minorities of any kind are always potentially vulnerable.’44 However, he
regarded the place of the complainant in the structures of advantage and
disadvantage as one of the central elements of the determination of
fairness or unfairness.45 Sachs J also acknowledged that even in the
41 Walker (n 7) para 81.
42 Walker (n 7) paras 107–8.
43 Walker (n 7) para 113.
44 Walker (n 7) para 123.
45 Walker (n 7) para 123.
443EQUALITY BEYOND DIGNITY
JOBNAME: Acta Juridica 15 PAGE: 15 SESS: 9 OUTPUT: Wed Jun 17 15:59:43 2015
/first/juta/Juta/acta−juridica15/ch20
absence of concrete disadvantage, the ‘symbolic effect of a measure . . .
could impair dignity in a way which constitutes unfair discrimination.’46
However, this would generally arise either where there was specific
targeting, or where it was ‘so related in impact to patterns of disadvantage
as to leave the persons concerned with the understandable feeling that
once more they were given the short end of the stick.’47 Most impor-
tantly, he did not regard the white inhabitants of Pretoria as, in the
circumstances, a politically vulnerable group.48 While we would not
agree with Sachs J’s argument that substantive principles should be
included at stage one of the equality analysis, we do agree that it is critical
to maintain disadvantage as a substantive value in the analysis of fairness,
weighed against, and not subservient to, dignity.
We would argue that had Langa DP explicitly considered all four
dimensions, and their interaction with each other, he would have had to
articulate explicitly, as did Sachs J, why this issue should take pre-
eminence. It is hard to see why political vulnerability and stigma dimen-
sions, although potential risks, were in fact weighty issues in relation to
the differential enforcement, which centred on encouragement and
changing the culture of non-payment, especially when put in the context
of the general affluence, political voice and self-confidence of the respon-
dents, and the history of non-payment in the townships as a political issue.
Many commentators have been sympathetic to, and praised, Justice
Langa’s judgment as reconciliatory, as a means of bringing recalcitrant
whites into the constitutional project.49 While we accept the constitu-
tional importance of this, we do not believe that it needed to be done at
the expense of a complex understanding of equality. As Sachs J notes, the
work could have been done under s 8(1), as arbitrary and irrational
differentiation.50
(2) Multiple dimensions and conflicting equalities: Bhe v Magistrate,
Khayelitsha
Like Walker, the Bhe case is challenging because it entails a potential
conflict between the different dimensions of equality. In addition, Bhe
raised the possibility of conflicting equalities generated by the constitu-
tional commitment to cultural diversity and to gender equality, allowing
us to investigate whether, and how, a multi-dimensional approach to
equality helps to resolve these tensions.
46 Walker (n 7) para 129.
47 Walker (n 7) para 129.
48 Walker (n 7) para 132.
49 See eg F Michaelman ‘Reasonable umbrage: Race and constitutional anti-discrimination
law in the United States and SouthAfrica’ (2003–2004) 117 Harvard LR 1378.
50 Walker (n 7) para 138. See also CAlbertyn ‘Equality’ in H Cheadle et al (eds) South African
Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2002) 51, 70.
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The South African Constitution has never envisaged equality as stand-
ing for conformity or assimilation. The value of accommodating differ-
ence and transforming structures to incorporate and affirm diversity is
present in several parts of the Constitution.51 Most importantly, as Langa
DCJ puts it in Bhe:
Certain provisions of the Constitution put it beyond doubt that our basic law
specifically requires that customary law should be accommodated, not merely
tolerated . . . provided the particular rules or provisions are not in conflict with
the Constitution.52
Therefore, merely ‘condemning rules or provisions of customary law on
the basis that they are different to those of the common law or legislation
. . . would be incorrect.’53 Recognition of customary law is required by
the commitment to equality as affirming diversity. It is only where the
form of customary law is one that attaches detriment and disadvantage to a
particular form of difference (such as gender) that an equality violation
should be triggered. Bhe demonstrates the relationship between differ-
ence and disadvantage in several ways: It shows how apartheid legislation
on customary law created racial difference and inequality that should be
overturned, while the cultural differences expressed in unwritten custom-
ary law might be affirmed, but in a manner that addresses embedded
gender and other inequalities.
The case addresses potential discrimination arising out of two different
systems of customary law: the official version of apartheid law and
unwritten ‘living’ law. So far as the regulatory scheme in s 23 of the Black
AdministrationAct 38 of 1927, its regulations and the Intestate Succession
Act 81 of 1987 was concerned, the fact that it provided specific conse-
quences to intestacy only for African people meant that it was a blatantly
racially discriminatory and unjustified provision, a remnant of the institu-
tionalised inequality of the apartheid past and a clear breach of the
requirement that substantive equality address stigma, humiliation and
prejudice.54 Section 23 ‘provides a scheme whereby the legal system that
governs intestate succession is determined simply by reference to skin
colour’.55 It is ‘a relic of our racist and painful past. This Court has, on a
number of occasions, expressed the need to purge the statute book of such
harmful and hurtful provisions’.56 Not only does it invoke the stigma
dimension, it also breaches the requirement to redress socio-economic
51 See for eg ss 15, 30, 31, 211 and 212 of the Constitution.
52 Bhe (n 8) para 41.
53 Bhe (n 8) para 42.
54 Bhe (n 8) paras 60–74.
55 Bhe (n 8) para 66.
56 Bhe (n 8) para 68.
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disadvantage, although this is expressed in a more limited and indirect
manner. As Langa DCJ notes, almost in passing, the only way for Africans
to extricate themselves from the regime created by the provision is to
make a will. This means that only those ‘with sufficient resources,
knowledge, education or opportunity to make an informed choice’ will
be able to extricate themselves.57 It is regrettable, though, that little is
made of the dimension of participation in this regard, in which the
barriers to making a will severely hamper the ability to make decisions as
to the devolution of one’s own property. This is, in itself, a potential
breach of substantive equality. Generally, Justice Langa found that there
was no justification for the provision: its apparent preservation of custom-
ary law was not through respect for difference, but from a desire to
maintain inferiority and thus impair dignity.58
What is particularly interesting about the court’s approach to the
official version of the customary law of inheritance is its failure to consider
gendered disadvantage and the intersectional impact of official customary
law on black women. The emphasis on racial discrimination and impair-
ment of dignity inherent in a system that prescribed legal consequences
based on the colour of one’s skin had already been established in the
earlier case of Moseneke.59 The racial provenance of the regulatory scheme
and its impact on dignity cannot be disputed. However, the official law
was often more complex in its impact, especially on women. Indeed, the
interaction betweenAfrican cultural representatives and colonial authori-
ties, and between customary and civil law, in codifying rules that preju-
dice women is well-documented.60 Here the effects of excluding women
from inheritance and condemning them to perpetual minority is not
simply stigmatising, it also hinders their access to resources (disadvantage),
and deprives women of voice within the family, and the ability to
participate in major decisions about themselves and their children. It is
only in the justification enquiry in s 36 that Justice Langa raises the racist
and sexist nature of s 23 and balances it against the purpose of the law.61
This seems incorrect: all of the elements of substantive equality should
have been considered in the fairness enquiry. In other words, a proper
consideration of the multiple dimensions of equality and their impact on
57 Bhe (n 8) para 66.
58 Bhe (n 8) paras 69–72.
59 Moseneke and Others v The Master and Another 2001 (2) SA 18 (CC), discussed in Bhe (n 8)
paras 60–8. It is interesting to note that theWomen’s Legal Centre, an amicus curiae in Bhe, had
raised the issue of gender in Moseneke, which was acknowledged but not addressed.
60 M Chanock Law, Custom and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia
(1985); S Burman ‘Fighting a two-pronged attack: The changing legal status of women in
Cape-ruled Basutoland, 1872–1884’ and J Guy ‘Gender oppression in Southern Africa’s
precapitalist societies’, both in CWalker Women and Gender in Southern Africa to 1945 (1990).
61 Bhe (n 8) para 73.
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black women might have been a better legal approach and would have
better reflected the nature of inequality on the ground.
The evaluation of the customary law of primogeniture, in its own
right, as part of a constitutionally-recognised system of law, was more
challenging. Here it was much more difficult to determine when the
accommodation of difference breached other dimensions of substantive
equality, especially those relating to gender equality, and therefore should
be eclipsed. The first step is to understand and value the nature of
difference. In particular, dignity in the context of customary law (as an
affirmation of self-worth of people living according to custom) envisages
a potentially far more communal role for the heir than is the case in
relation to common law. Inheritance therefore needed to be considered as
a system of responsibility, not merely of individual proprietary rights, but
as one in which the heir was required tomanage the property for the good
of the family and wider kinship structure. On the other hand, there was a
strong sense in which the role of women had been ossified by the
codification of customary law – implicating women’s dignity (affecting
their self-worth through stigma and prejudice) and socio-economic
disadvantage (access to resources and material deprivation). These limita-
tions on women’s capacity are strikingly similar to the law of coverture in
nineteenth century Britain,62 and indeed to South African common law,
vestiges of which persisted as late as 1993.
The judgment recognises that accommodating and valuing diversity, as
represented by customary law, needs to be evaluated in the context of the
other dimensions: the need to prevent stigma, redress disadvantage, and
enhance participation. For women and extra-marital children, all of these
dimensions were breached. Given changing social patterns, including
urbanisation, new family structures and different land use, women could
no longer rely on the heir to make economic provision for them and were
thus were seriously disadvantaged by their inability to inherit on intestacy.
Notably, Langa DCJ was also very clear that the dimension of material
disadvantage did not constitute the only dimension of inequality. Instead,
he recognised that even in the rare cases in which older social structures
persisted and in which provision was made for women, the dignity
dimension was breached:
The principle of primogeniture also violates the right of women to human
dignity as guaranteed in section 10 of the Constitution as, in one sense, it
implies that women are not fit or competent to own and administer property.
Its effect is also to subject these women to a status of perpetual minority,
placing them automatically under the control of male heirs, simply by virtue of
their sex and gender. Their dignity is further affronted by the fact that as
62 See further S Fredman Women and the Law (1997) ch 2.
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women, they are also excluded from intestate succession and denied the right,
which other members of the population have, to be holders of, and to control
property.63
The same was true for extra-marital children, where the law and social
practice ‘without doubt conferred a stigma upon themwhich was harmful
and degrading’.64 Similarly, ‘extra-marital children did, and still do, suffer
from social stigma and impairment of dignity’.65
Finally, although not always made explicit, the elements of inclusion
and participation are present, especially when Justice Langa addresses the
cultural justification for primogeniture, namely the ‘basic social need to
sustain the family unit’ and balances it against the gender discrimination
implicated in the rule.66 He concludes that while the maintenance of the
family remained an important communitarian purpose, the responsibility
for this could not be limited to elder males to the exclusion of women (or
younger men and unmarried sons). Although uneven and not always
explicit, the judgment on unwritten customary law is an example of the
use of all four dimensions of substantive equality – and an important
(although implicit) development of the dignity approach in previous
cases.
There has been considerable debate about the remedies in this case and
the manner in which they might limit a proper commitment to legal
pluralism.We comment on these further in the conclusion. However, the
equality analysis on unwritten customary law – in addressing several
dimensions of inequality – seems to provide a flexible and balanced
approach to claims that implicate gender equality and cultural diversity. It
allows both a detailed interrogation of the nature of gender inequality
under customary law, and a full examination of the positive value of
custom and culture in a contemporary setting. As such it allows the court
to balance cultural diversity with gender equality.
(3) Affirming difference and diversity: Pillay
In MEC for Education, Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay, decided under the Promo-
tion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair DiscriminationAct 4 of 2000, a
complaint of cultural discrimination was brought against a school for
failing to allow a learner to wear a nose-ring as a voluntary expression of
her culture. In particular, the case considered whether the school should
have granted a religious or cultural exemption to the learner in terms of its
code of conduct. Cultural discrimination issues in South Africa raise
63 Bhe (n 8) para 92.
64 Bhe (n 8) para 57.
65 Bhe (n 8) para 59.
66 Bhe (n 8) paras 84 and 89–91.
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potentially conflicting ideas of equality: equality across different cultures
in the context of racially-based intolerance and exclusion, as well as
equality within particular cultural groupings, especially concerning
women. If Bhe raised issues of gender discrimination within customary
law, Pillay was solely concerned with defining culture, recognising and
affirming cultural diversity and requiring appropriate adaptation and
accommodation on the part of mainstream and historically privileged
cultures.67 Although Pillay does not raise the more complex issues of
cross-cutting inequalities, it does raise the question of how to define
culture in such a way that does not foreclose a more detailed evaluation of
intra-group inequalities, including gender discrimination, when these
become relevant.
Pillay brings the difference dimension of equality to centre stage, with a
particular emphasis on questions of cultural identity and participation, and
on the dignity dimension of equality. In determining the ambit of
discrimination based on culture, the court highlights the importance of
membership of cultural communities to individual identity and dignity:
Dignity and identity are inseparably linked as one’s sense of self-worth is
defined by one’s identity. Cultural identity is one of the most important parts
of a person’s identity precisely because it flows from belonging to a commu-
nity and not from personal choice or achievement. And belonging involves
more than simple association; it includes participation and expression of the
community’s practices and traditions.68
In affirming cultural difference, the court emphasises the dignity-related
interests of identity and self-determination (‘respect for the unique set of
ends that an individual wishes to pursue’),69 but also alludes to the
importance of participation within the community of one’s choice.
Perhaps because there was no immediate disadvantage implicated in this
case (the learner was not excluded from the school as a price of adhering
to her cultural convictions), this aspect is less visible. Nevertheless, Langa
CJ is aware of the wider context of structural disadvantage, when he
defines the comparator group as ‘those learners whose sincere religious or
cultural beliefs or practices are not compromised by the Code, as
compared to those whose beliefs or practices are compromised’.70 This is
in recognition that ‘[t]he norm embodied by the Code is not neutral, but
enforces mainstream and historically privileged forms of adornment, . . .
at the expense of minority and historically excluded forms’.71
67 Pillay (n 9) para 44.
68 Pillay (n 9) para 53.
69 Pillay (n 9) para 64.
70 Pillay (n 9) para 44.
71 Pillay (n 9) para 44.
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The judgment, however, only begins to delve into the complex
challenges of affirming diversity within a multi-dimensional conception
of equality. There are several dilemmas that require resolution. The first
concerns the interaction between the participation dimension and that of
diversity. Who speaks for cultural norms within the relevant group?
While affirming diversity and its value to individual identity is a key
element in substantive equality, a multi-dimensional approach to equality
requires the parallel recognition that assertions of cultural norms can also
be exclusionary and reinforce internal hierarchies. This risk needs to be
counteracted by ensuring that the voices of those affected are clearly
heard, and that the effect of affirming diversity is not to reinforce internal
inequalities. This is particularly important for women. In Pillay, the
learner’s mother consistently spoke for her. The court took some care to
establish whether the mother genuinely reflected her daughter’s views,
ultimately accepting her role, even though the learner had not partici-
pated in person.While this might be appropriate in this case and the court
clearly signalled some awareness of the importance of voice, it arguably
gave too little credence to the risk, for other cases, of reinforcing
intra-group hierarchies, particularly given the ease with which dominant
voices have been permitted to define cultural norms, often at the expense
of women.
The second and related challenge concerns the interaction between
affirming diversity and the other dimensions, namely to prevent stigma,
prejudice, stereotyping and violence; and to redress disadvantage, which
is particularly important in dealing with claims of intra-group inequality.
For example, virginity testing, revived as a traditional practice in the past
two decades, is widely practised and justified as a cultural practice that
protects girls against HIV and unwanted pregnancies, that celebrates their
status as girls and virgins, and that instils cultural values of sexual
responsibility and self-respect.72 However it is also strongly contested by
human rights and women’s groups who claim that it is a new form of
social control of women in the context of anxieties over the HIV
epidemic,73 and that it amounts to a harmful practice that violates the
rights of girls, places sexual responsibility on girls alone and stigmatises
those found to be ‘impure’.74 Balancing these arguments is particularly
difficult. In some instances, the issue of individual choice has been used.
For example, South African law allows virginity testing on girls over the
age of 16 if they consent to this. At the same time, an abstract idea of
72 Submission of the Human Rights Commission to the Select Committee on Social
Services, October 2005; L Law ‘Virginity testing: In the best interests of the child?’ Briefing
Paper 145 for the Catholic Parliamentary Liaison Office (November 2005).
73 S Leclerc-Madlala ‘Virginity testing: Managing sexuality in a maturing HIV/AIDS
epidemic’ (2001) 15 Medical Anthropology Quarterly 533.
74 Commission for Gender Equality Virginity Testing, Report June 2004.
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individual choice might fail to see the context in which girls have little
choice but to consent to a practice that is strongly supported by dominant
community values.75 Thus it is important to maintain the multi-dimen-
sional approach: evaluating cultural justifications against evidence of
gendered stigma and disadvantage and the possibilities of meaningful
consent/choice.
A related concern is that the definition of culture needs to facilitate the
exploration of intra-group inequalities and a multi-dimensional
approach. This raises important questions about the interpretation of
cultural discrimination at step one of the unfair discrimination enquiry,
and the content of unfairness at step two.76 A lower threshold at step one
involves a generous interpretation of culture and places a heavier burden
on the unfairness enquiry to engage the various dimensions of substantive
equality. A higher threshold at step one provides an important filter at the
entry stage of the enquiry. Important at step one is whether culture should
be subjectively or objectively, individually or collectively, defined. The
worry is that an overly individualised and subjective interpretation of
culture would mitigate against an exploration of power, contestation and
inequalities within a particular cultural group.
Here the disagreement between Justices Langa and O’Regan is instruc-
tive. Although Langa CJ finds it unnecessary to decide whether a cultural
practice should be objectively or subjectively determined, he does find,
on the facts, that it was sufficient for there to be a subjective, sincere belief
that the nose stud was a cultural practice.77 He also concludes that a
voluntary practice is sufficiently important to the constitutional commit-
ment to diversity for it to be recognised as a constitutionally-protected
practice for the purposes of determining discrimination.78 O’Regan J
disagrees with the low threshold set by Langa CJ, citing a number of
difficulties with a subjective approach. Two stand out. Firstly, it does not
sufficiently acknowledge the associative nature of cultural practice.79 One
needs to distinguish a personal habit or preference from a practice that is
recognised by some, if not all of, the community. Secondly, it too easily
admits of toleration of an individual’s sincere beliefs rather than a real
appreciation and respect for cultural diversity.80 O’Regan J’s concern is
well-placed. An overly subjective approach tends towards a bounded
75 See C Albertyn ‘ ‘‘The stubborn persistence of patriarchy’’: Gender equality and cultural
diversity in SouthAfrica’ (2009) 2 Constitutional Court Review 165.
76 As with the constitutional equality test set out in Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA300 (CC)
para 53, the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000
separates the issue of discrimination in s 13 from the determination of unfairness in s 14.
77 Pillay (n 9) para 58.
78 Pillay (n 9) paras 61–7.
79 Pillay (n 9) para 154.
80 Pillay (n 9) para 156.
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view of culture which allows certain cultural representatives to assert a
cultural practice, without it being tested against the community.
Although Langa CJ does assert a contested view of culture,81 his approach
provides little space to explore the consequences of power within
communities. In his defence, one might argue that his approach was, in
fact, to assert the subjective, individual view of a vulnerable community
member, in this case a girl. But what if the claim was for protection of a
subjective, but patriarchal practice, by a male community leader? One
needs more than a subjective and sincere belief to test the validity of a
cultural claim. Not only must there a full interrogation of contested views
to determine whether a particular practice can be deemed sufficiently
‘associative’ or communal to be deemed a cultural practice, but the place
and effects of power and hierarchy must be interrogated, inter alia, we
suggest, through considering disadvantage and participation. For
example, the fact that President Zuma claimed a particular cultural
defence in his 2002 rape trial, namely that he was culturally bound to
satisfy a woman who was sexually aroused, does not mean that this
qualified as a cultural practice. It must be more than a subjective belief;
rather it must be shown to be a ‘practice that is shared in a broader
community of which he or she is a member and from which he or she
draws meaning.’82 And even then, the consequences of this approach for
women and sexual choice would need to be considered. It seems that
allowing a subjective belief to constitute a cultural practice is insufficient.
There should be some evidence of an associative practice to provide a
minimum threshold of protection that will exclude partial and subjective
cultural beliefs that have no communal resonance, as well as enable
effective dialogue on the constitutionality of the practice.
The approach of Langa CJ might still enable substantive equality if the
fairness enquiry was fully interrogated, as required by the provisions of s 14
of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair DiscriminationAct.
However, Justice Langa finds the case to be one in which only a consider-
ation of reasonable accommodation is required (rather than all the criteria
of s 14).83 Here the court’s approach is also limited in so far as it interrogates
the need for accommodation by way of an exception. This seems to
reinforce cultural hierarchies, suggesting that minority cultures can only be
affirmed through such a process. Affirmation of difference in a substantive
sense requires that institutions and rules be restructured to be fully inclusive.
Although we have little space to venture into this debate here, we suggest
that there might have been alternative ways of ‘accommodating’ cultural
practices, that were less likely to reinforce dominant norms.
81 Pillay (n 9) para 54.
82 Pillay (n 9) para 159.
83 Pillay (n 9) paras 77–8.
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Pillay leaves much undecided on substantive equality and cultural
discrimination, in particular, the definition of culture and the proper
relationship between this and the evaluation of unfairness. Again we
suggest that an explicit adoption of a multi-dimensional approach to
equality, by raising the threshold of defining culture at step one and
interrogating all dimensions at step two provides a means of addressing
systemic, cultural inequality as well as potential conflicts between culture
and other constitutional equality guarantees.
IV JUSTICE LANGA’S LEGACYAND CONTESTED EQUALITY
JURISPRUDENCE
This paper has argued for a multi-dimensional approach to equality that
takes account of dignity, disadvantage, difference and participation. We
thus disagree with the dominant approach of the court, which has been to
subsume all equality harms under an idea of the impairment of dignity, as
equal human worth, in different forms. Justice Langa’s equality judgments
seem to suggest an alternative, if not fully articulated, approach (that is also
present in some other cases)84 in which dignity is one aspect of a more
balanced and flexible evaluation of equality claims. We do not claim that
Justice Langa adopted such an approach, nor do we seek to attribute more
to his legacy than it might be able to bear. Rather, we argue that his
judgments provide an opportunity for a fuller examination of how to deal
with complex inequalities in a manner that is more likely to achieve
substantive equality ends.
The first indication of a wider approach to substantive equality was in
Justice Langa’s independent recognition of social and economic disadvan-
tage in Walker and his deep concern with gendered disadvantage in Bhe.
In both instances, he articulates disadvantage as an important and separate
consideration from the dignity-related stigma that attaches to racial and
gendered stereotypes. It is also apparent in his extra-curial writings, most
obviously in his much-quoted discussion on transformative constitution-
alism in which he cites Albertyn and Goldblatt to suggest that a ‘new
society . . . based on substantive equality’85 will –
require a complete reconstruction of the state and society, including a
redistribution of power and resources along egalitarian lines. The challenge of
achieving equality within this transformation project involves the eradication
of systemic forms of domination and material disadvantage based on race,
gender, class and other grounds of inequality. It also entails the development of
84 We suggest that some of the equality judgments of Justices Mokgoro, O’Regan and Sachs
also enable the development of a more multi-dimensional approach.
85 P Langa ‘Transformative constitutionalism’ (2006) 3 Stell LR 351 at 352.
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opportunities which allow people to realise their full human potential within
positive social relationships.86
We have also pointed to Justice Langa’s concern with diversity and
participation. Overall, in all three cases, it is possible to discern a
sensitivity to all dimensions of substantive equality, including exclusion,
lack of voice and the costs of lack of conformity to dominant norms. In
this way, the contours of a multi-faceted understanding of substantive
equality are discernible. The fact these are not always explicit within his
judgments, or that the dimensions are not fully explicated reveals a
developing and contested jurisprudence, rather than a clear commitment
to a single approach.
Fundamentally, Justice Langa’s equality jurisprudence attests to a jurist
who was deeply committed to the constitutional project as an inclusive
and reconciliatory, and as entailing a ‘social and economic revolution’.87
It is explicit in his concern with those whom he perceived as weak and the
vulnerable, whether women under customary law or young girls of a
minority religion and culture, and in his desire to bring all SouthAfricans
into this constitutional project. This instinct explains his recognition that
white people are a potentially vulnerable political minority and are
deserving of equal concern and respect in the proper application of the
rule of law, and in his clear insistence that customary law must conform to
the Constitution, especially where it included ‘old notions of patriarchy
and male domination incompatible with the guarantee of equality under
this constitutional order’.88
Langa set his face against exclusion and disadvantage, whether based on
race, ethnicity or gender. He recognised the common humanity in all and
the need to build a common South African solidarity and citizenship
across difference. In Bhe he ordered a remedy that has proved controver-
sial amongst some scholars,89 namely, to replace the customary law on
inheritance with civil law, but to apply this, also, to polygamous unions.
He justified this by arguing:
What should however be borne in mind is that the task of preventing
on-going violations of human rights is urgent. The rights involved are very
important, implicating the foundational values of our Constitution. The
victims of the delays in rectifying the defects in the legal system are those who
are among the most vulnerable of our society.90
86 Albertyn & Goldblatt (n 2) 249, cited in Langa (n 85) 352.
87 Langa (n 85) 352.
88 Bhe (n 8) para 91.
89 See eg C Himonga ‘The advancement of women’s rights in the first decade of democracy
in South Africa: The reform of the customary law of marriage and succession’ in C Murray &
M O’Sullivan Advancing Women’s Rights (2005) 82.
90 Bhe (n 8) para 115.
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Here Justice Langa did not shy away from imbuing customary law with
the necessary rights.
If his judgments provide important evidence of the need for a multi-
dimensional notion of equality, overall the record of the court in doing so
is ambiguous. On the one hand, we find the stark and well-known
reversion to formal reasoning and notions of formal equality in S v
Jordan,91 and the over-emphasis on abstract notions of choice in Volks NO
v Robinson.92 On the other hand, conflicting approaches to the tension
between recognition of difference, and the importance of redressing
disadvantage, countering stereotyping and facilitating voice and participa-
tion are evident in recent decisions on customary law. Thus the majority
judgement in Mayelane v Ngwenyama underlines the value of customary
law and its resistance to incorporation by the dominant common law
norm, while also insisting on the right of women to participate in
decision-making in relation to future wives of their husbands.93 Its
reluctance to address head-on the equality concerns around polygyny,
despite openly referring to them, is both a strategic and a legal concern. It
reflects the court’s growing acceptance of the need to develop customary
law, whenever possible, in line with the dictates of the Constitution,
including gender equality. Justice Langa would have signed on to this
judgment. However, this approach is contested by a minority of judges
who seem more resistant to the resolution of these tensions and the
‘intrusion’ of constitutional rights in customary law. This was evident in
the minority judgments in Pilane v Pilane94 and Mayelane,95 which signal
that the balance is tipping towards an accommodation of difference which
threatens to undermine the other factors of substantive equality, in
particular, participation and voice, redressing disadvantage (both material
and in terms of power differentials) and reinforcing of stigma and
stereotypes (inferiority of women).
The legacy of Justice Langa in the equality field is a powerful one, even
if it does not fully articulate the approach that we advocate for in this
article. However, we suggest that our engagement with the late Chief
Justice’s judgments supports the need for greater attention to the multi-
faceted nature of substantive equality and a clearer articulation of the
relationship between the facets should guide future courts in addressing
breaches of s 9 of the Constitution.
91 2002 (6) SA642 (CC).
92 Volks (n 21).
93 2013 (4) SA415 (CC).
94 2013 (4) BCLR 431 (CC). See paras 69–72 which stated importance of constitutional
rights to association and expression in traditional communities and possibility of dissent,
compared to the minority which resisted these rights and asserted a monolithic view of a
traditional authority.
95 Mayelane (n 93).
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